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Bangladesh has witnessed major strides in providing financial services to the rural
poor.  These services are provided largely through innovative group-based credit
programs of several nongovernmental organizations.  The implicit but widespread 
assumption has been that they are indeed placed in special poverty-stricken areas.  Is this
assumption valid?  If not, what factors actually affect programs' placement across
communities?  This paper uses an unique thana-level data set to analyze the placement of
three group-based credit programs in Bangladesh.  Analysis of branch placement indicates
that, unlike commercial banks, nongovernmental institutions do respond to general
conditions of poverty.  However, it appears that NGO services are located more in poor
pockets of relatively well-developed areas than in remoter, less-developed regions.  Client
density of the established branches, however, did not exhibit such a feature and actually
tended to be better in less advantageous locations.CONTENTS
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In recent years, Bangladesh has witnessed major strides in delivering financial
services to the rural poor. The providers of these services have mainly been innovative
group-based credit programs run by several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  A
number of studies are now available that describe how these new institutional
arrangements dispensed with physical collateral and facilitated access of the poor to
savings and credit services (Zeller, Sharma, and Ahmed 1996; Hossain 1988).  However,
only scant attention has so far been given to the determinants of the placement of branch
NGO institutions and the client coverage of their operations across regions.  Khandker,
Khalily, and Khan (1995) find that commercial banks in Bangladesh favor well-endowed
areas, and a study in India (Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 1993) concluded that
commercial banks were more likely to be located in places where the road infrastructure
and marketing system are relatively developed.  Is this also the case with group-based
credit systems of NGOs?  In other words, do NGO programs target their services to the
poor in relatively underdeveloped or disadvantaged regions or do they locate their
branches in the relatively better endowed areas?  What kinds of tensions arise between
organizational goals and performance standards and/or requirements at the operations
level?  Once branches have been placed, what does client coverage look like across
branches?  For example, do the decisions on branch placement and client coverage follow
similar patterns, or is there evidence of discontinuity?  To what extent does the decision2
 For administrative purposes, Bangladesh is divided into four divisions and 64 districts. Each district
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is further divided into thanas. A thana is an administrative unit that corresponds with the jurisdiction of a
police station. 
related to client coverage appear to be decentralized (Ravallion and Wodon 1997)? 
Knowing whether certain types of areas are systematically favored or disfavored is of
interest and importance to policy makers as well as to program managers.  This
knowledge can also assist in disentangling program effects from location effects and hence
is useful for an assessment of the impact of group-based credit programs (Pitt,
Rosenzweig, and Gibbons 1995). 
This paper makes use of secondary level data from 391 administrative units termed
thanas  to examine the placement of branches and group coverage of three well-known
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NGO credit institutions in Bangladesh:  Association of Social Advancement (ASA),
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and Proshika Manobik Unnayan
Kendra (PROSHIKA).  In Section 2, major characteristics of these NGO institutions are
described (see Zeller, Sharma, and Ahmed [1996] for more detail).  Section 3 first outlines
a framework for analyzing placement decisions of Bangladeshi NGOs and then goes ahead
to propose a number of hypotheses on placement of branches that were tested
econometrically.  Results on branch placement are presented in Section 4, while those on
client coverage are presented in Section 5.  The last section summarizes findings and
policy implications.  The study concludes that because the multiple objectives of the
NGOs introduces considerable tension in service placement decisions of NGOs,3
organizational innovations that reduce such tensions will serve to strengthen institutions.
A number of specific recommendations are made in this regard.
2.  THE INSTITUTIONS
There are five common threads that weave around the institutional structures of the
ASA, BRAC, and PROSHIKA.  First, services are strictly targeted to a well-defined set of
clients:  the most common criterion is the amount of land owned and all three NGOs
target landless or near-landless households.  Second, credit is always provided to small
groups of borrowers on the basis of joint liability and without the pledging of any physical
collateral.  Third, even though loans are made out to individual members, the entire group
is denied further credit when outstanding arrears exist for any one of the members. 
Fourth, lending activities are supplemented by training activities in areas ranging from
entrepreneurial skill development, management of microenterprises like shopkeeping, and
crafts production, to education on social awareness and family planning activities.  Fifth,
groups are required to contribute to an emergency fund that may be used when members
experience household and other emergencies.
Loan recovery rates of all three institutions are impressive when compared with
those of commercial banks.  During the period 1992-93, for example, they were 100
percent for ASA, 98 percent for BRAC, and 93 percent for PROSHIKA.  Additional
institution-specific details are as follows.4
ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT (ASA)
ASA, one of the largest indigenous NGOs in Bangladesh, was set up in 1978.  It
implements programs in the areas of income generation, integrated health, and education
and empowerment of the poor and its Income Generation through Credit Program (IGCP)
was launched in 1989.  The principal objective of the program is to increase income levels
and purchasing power of the poor households.  ASA extends credit facilities to the female
members of the poor households for investment in various income-generating activities. 
The major income generating activities receiving support under the IGCP program are
paddy husking, cow/goat rearing, poultry farming, small trading, and handicrafts.  Nearly
190,000 members received loans under the program in 1993. 
BANGLADESH RURAL ADVANCEMENT COMMITTEE (BRAC)
BRAC was set up in 1972, following the independence of the country in 1971.  At
its birth, the primary goal of BRAC was to participate in the post-independence
rehabilitation work of the war-ravaged country.  It launched its campaign with a small
rehabilitation project in Sylhet district in the northeast of Bangladesh.  Gradually, BRAC
expanded its operation to other parts of the country.  BRAC initiated its credit program in
1976 (BRAC 1991).  The present form of the program, which was introduced in 1990, is
known as the Rural Credit Project (RCP).  RCP is an important component of BRAC's
larger Rural Development Project (RDP).  The objectives of RDP are fourfold:  (1) to
generate employment opportunity for both males and females, (2) to mobilize under- and5
unutilized resources, (3) to assist in diffusing appropriate technology in the rural areas,
and (4) to promote better health care.  The cumulative amount of loan disbursed through
RCP from 1990 through 1992 stood at Tk 1,745 million and during 1992, short-term
loans accounted for 94 percent of total disbursement.  Loans are generally extended for a
specified line of projects.  In 1992, for example, rural trading and food processing
accounted for nearly 73 percent of the loans.  Livestock, agriculture, rural industry, and
irrigation accounted for another 23 percent.  As of June 1993, 70 branches of RCP were
in operation with a coverage of 379,000 members.
PROSHIKA MANOBIK UNNAYAN KENDRA (PROSHIKA)
PROSHIKA was founded in 1976 with the aim of empowering the poor by enabling
them to participate in mainstream economic activities.  Its objectives include achieving
structural poverty alleviation, improving status of women, and increasing people's
participation in public institutions.  PROSHIKA operates group saving and revolving loan
fund activities under its Employment and Income Generating (EIG) program.  The
revolving loan fund program, launched in 1983, and funded 10,809 projects with total
fund disbursed amounting to nearly Tk 224 million in the 1992/93 financial year.6
3.  FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLACEMENT OF BRANCHES
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
When guided by the sole objective of maximizing profits, the decision to place a
branch in a particular location is relatively straightforward, as it can be based on standard
cost theory:  it makes sense to open an additional outlet whenever projected marginal
revenue from a new service center is at least as high as the total cost of establishing the
branch.  Of course, this decision may be additionally complicated by whether the
organization entering in the market is big enough to influence prices.  Also, before
resources are committed, the firm is free to choose the scale of operations based on its
knowledge of expected demand conditions, and this decision will affect the unit cost of
supplying services.  Once a branch is opened—that is, once resources are committed, and
the scale of operation fixed, the service volume in the short run (during the time in which
scale is fixed) is provided such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost (now composed
of two components: one that is fixed and the other that is variable).  Of course,
possibilities of expanding the scale of operations in the future remains:  this decision
would depend on expected changes in the demand for services, and the extent to which
moving onto a larger scale of operation brings about substantial reduction in unit costs of
providing services.  The organization is also free to shut down the branch:  this it will do if
average revenue does not cover average variable costs.
Can the above framework be applied to analyze placement and outreach decisions
of the Bangladeshi NGOs?  The answer is in the negative, mainly because profit making is7
not a principal aim of these organizations.  We outline two important considerations that
are likely to affect branch placement and client outreach decisions of the NGOs. First, as
indicated in an earlier section, all the three NGOs came into being principally as a response
to the challenge of delivering basic social services to an impoverish population further
destituted, at that time, by a devastating war of liberation.  The management decision
within these organizations were/are therefore primarily responsive to goals underlined in
the original mission or the charter under which these institutions were established. 
Second, the original mission is likely to be modified by at least another important
consideration:  the interest represented by the principal financiers of the institutions,
composed of international as well as national donors.  All three NGOs received and/or
continue to receive funding from such sources and, by implication, are likely to be bound
by any conditionalities accompanying such arrangements.  We argue that these
conditionalities relate primarily to maintaining some minimum standards of financial
performance (e.g., caps on delinquency rates and administrative costs) and demonstrating
some minimum level of positive program impact.  Below, we propose that fulfilling
original organizational objectives as well as conditionalities imposed by financiers result in
four specific considerations in branch placement and client coverage:  (1) poverty
targeting, (2) expected demand for services, (3) cost of supplying services, and (4)
perceived riskiness in operations.  An econometric model incorporating these
considerations is specified and then tested in subsequent sections.Bi ’ f(Pi,E(Di)E(Ci),Ri) ,
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(1)
The placement rule followed by NGOs is specified in equation (1), where the 
decision to place a branch, B, by an NGO credit institution is specified as a function of  i
where P is a vector that describes poverty conditions in thana i, E(D) is the expected i                      i
level of demand for credit services in that thana, E(C) is the expected level of cost of i
providing services, and R is an index of the riskiness of conducting credit-related business i
in the thana.  Each of these are discussed below.
Poverty Targeting
All three NGOs, who are among the largest in the micro-finance NGO movement in
Bangladesh (Credit and Development Forum 1996), claim to be guided, first and
foremost, by a common mission to serve the poorest in the rural areas (ASA 1996a,
1996b; Lovell 1992; BRAC 1994).  ASA, which provides credit exclusively to women, for
example, aims at creating "a broader space for marginalized women of rural areas as they
can participate in income generation activities to increase income" ASA (1994, p. 4).
BRAC, on the other hand, aims to work "exclusively with disadvantaged sections of the
community" (Chowdhury, Mahmood, and Abed 1991, p. 4) and focuses on poor landless
groups, and PROSHIKA has an explicit mission to "empower the poor" (Jahangir and
Zeller 1995).  Given these kinds of mission statements, a reasonable hypothesis is that,9
conditional upon other factors, thanas with higher poverty levels will have a higher
probability of a branch placement.
 There are, however, two additional questions:  (1) What criteria of poverty do
these institutions apply with respect to individuals in targeting their operations; (2) What
criteria do these institutions apply in making the operational decisions on which areas to
target their activities.  The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward.  All
three programs have clear and strict poverty-based eligibility rules that are well-enforced.
BRAC lends only to those who own less than 0.5 acres of land and additionally works as a
laborer for at least 100 days in a year (Lovell 1992).  ASA, on the other hand, lends to
women owning less than 0.5 acres of land and whose income does not exceed Tk 1,200
per month and who also sells her labor for at least 200 days a year.  However, the
response of NGOs to the large differences in poverty levels between different locations in
making the decisions about placement of their branches is a more difficult question.  A
reasonable assumption is that the NGOs base their decisions on various types of indicators
of poverty.  One testable hypothesis is that NGOs locate their branches in thanas that have
larger proportions of households owning less than 0.5 acres of land—as this criterion most
closely defines their target households.  This need not be the only criterion, however. 
Two hypothesis explore other criteria.  Two additional criteria are proposed in this study: 
thana-wise literacy rates and thana-wise levels of "distress" index developed by the Helen
Keller Institute (HKI) in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Helen Keller International 1994), in
operationalizing the vulnerability-focus of its program.  Literacy rates generally highlyE(Di) ’ g(Wi) ,
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(2)
correlate with poverty levels, and the HKI distress index combines information on
susceptibility to flooding (a frequently occurring natural disaster in Bangladesh), general
wage levels, and availability of irrigation facilities—all being major factors affecting the
level of well-being in Bangladesh.
Expected Level of Demand for Credit Services
The expected level of demand for credit services in an area is likely to receive
important consideration for two reasons.  First, it would be important for the NGOs to
avoid areas where credit demand is likely to be either nonexistent or lower than some
minimum threshold that makes credit delivery prohibitively costly to administer.  Second,
the marginal impact of NGO services on participating households, a major concern for the
NGOs, is likely to be the highest in areas with the strongest credit demand.  This is
because credit demand is likely to be the strongest in areas that are affected relatively less
by other accompanying constraints—on labor and product markets, transportation, and
information.  Hence, expected demand for credit is expressed as
where the vector, W, consists of thana-level variables that affect the level of credit i
demand and may include the following variables:11
• level of physical infrastructural development such as access to markets, roads,
electricity, irrigation, and other services;
• agroclimatic conditions and general income levels; and
• level of urbanization and commercialization of the local economy.
Cost of Supplying Services
As indicated before, while profit-seeking institutions select locations where
expected revenues are at least as high as expected total cost, this may not necessarily be
the case of NGOs, as they do not have profit maximization as their explicit objective.
Further, NGOs receive subsidies of different types to operate in specific geographical
areas and also implement various types of cross-subsidization schemes between branches. 
For this reason, they are not likely to base their placement decision solely on potential net
revenues.  How expected unit costs operation affects placement of branches, hence, is
essentially an empirical issue.
But there are at least two other cost-related issues that are likely to be important in
the placement calculation.  These concern general security operations and the availability
of banking services.  Credit transactions necessarily involve handling of cash, raising
security concerns.  Proximity to police stations and other law and order establishments
may therefore be important.  Moreover, when NGOs do not provide their own banking
services but depend on the branch of a commercial or parastatal bank to make cash
disbursements and deposits, then proximity to commercial banks becomes important.  IfE(Ci) ’ g(Zi) ,
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commercial banks are generally located in areas that are more urbanized or benefit from
better infrastructure (as Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig [1993] have shown),
then NGOs may also tend to place branches in or near these locations.
A third issue relates to staffing of branches.  Since branch managers are recruited
from a central pool, and since salaries and other compensations do not reward
appointments in more remote locations, managers are likely to prefer locations that have
fairly well-developed services (education, market, health).  If these considerations are
significant in the decision to place branches, placement will be higher in thanas that have
such services.
To account for all these consideration, we let the expected total cost function be
specified as
where the vector, Z, consists of thana-level variables that affect the level of unit service i
delivery costs.  In practice, vectors W in equation (2) and Z are likely to be very similar if i          i
not identical.
Perceived Riskiness
An important goal of NGOs administering credit programs is to maintain high
repayment rates.  Indeed, as noted earlier, all NGO programs report repayment rates in
excess of 90 percent. Maintaining near-perfect repayment rates is critical for NGOs.  ThisE(Ci) ’ g(Vi) .
Bi’Ni"%Wi$%Zi(%Vi* .
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 Note that repayment rate is distinct from net financial returns.  In the presence of subsidies, net
2
revenues may be negative even when repayment is 100 percent.
(4)
(5)
is because most of the subsidies they receive from national and international donors appear
to be conditional on maintaining such rates.  This objective of maintaining high repayment
rates  may also affect the placement of branches.  In particular, NGOs are likely to avoid
2
areas where marginal returns from new microenterprises are low (poor, backward areas
where complementary services either do not exist or are highly inadequate).  They are also
likely to avoid areas that are highly susceptible to natural disasters such as flooding and
other covariate risks.  We let the risk expectation function be specified as
Elements in V include poverty indicators such as literacy rate, level and distribution of i
landholding, and also the HKI distress level indicator described earlier.
4.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
A linear specification of the placement equation (1), upon substituting for equations
(2)-(4), would be
However, as indicated in the previous section, it is in principle (and also due to data
limitations) very difficult to identify N, W, Z, and V separately.  For example, it is veryBi ’ j 0i Xi % µd % ei
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(6)
difficult to find variables that affect poverty levels but not credit demand or riskiness of
conducting business.  A more practical formulation is therefore to regard the elements in
N, W, Z, and V to be common and represented by the vector X, as i
and interpreting its coefficient, 0 0 = (" " + $ $ + ( ( + * *), as the combined effects of the four i i    i    i    i
determinants of placement.  After all, infrastructure, urbanization, and other community-
level endowments are likely to jointly affect levels of poverty as well as demand for credit
services, the cost of credit service delivery, and the riskiness of conducting business. 
Similarly, susceptibility to natural disasters simultaneously affects poverty, credit demand
patterns and the riskiness and costs of doing business.  Note that a priori expectations on
the sign of 0 0 are difficult to place unless ", $, (, and * are of the same expected signs.  i            i   i   i     i
However, it is possible to make inferences based on the signs of the estimated coefficients
on the relative strengths of some subset of the variables.  This is Section 4.
A different consideration is the effect of unobservables.  If placement of government
infrastructural programs as well as levels of poverty are functions of unobservable factors
such as agroclimatic potentials of lands, historical or political considerations, then
exclusion of such factors in equation (6) is likely to lead to biased estimates of the 0s.  In
order to minimize bias arising out of location-specific unobservables, a district level of
effect µ  is included in equation (6).  Since B in equation (6) is a binary dependent variable d               i
taking the value of one whenever there is a branch of the NGO in a thana and zero15
otherwise, the equation is estimated using the fixed effects logit estimation that sweeps out
the effects of district-level unobservables.
The vector X in equation (6) contains the following variables (See Table 1 for
descriptive statistics).
Poverty-related variables
LANDSIZE The percentage of farms in the thana that are below 0.5 acres in size
LITERATE The percentage of population literate in the thana
Infrastructure-related variables
ELECTRICITY The percentage of villages electrified in the thana
MARKET The number of market centers in the thana
DENSITY The population density of the thana
URBAN The percentage of urban population in the thana
ROAD The kilometer of metaled road per 1,000 persons in the thana
HOSPITAL The number of population per hospital bed in the thana
DOCTOR The number of population per doctor in the thana
POSTOFFICE The number of post offices in the thana
Risk/Poverty-related variable
DISTRESS The thana-wise distress index computed by the Helen Keller Institute
All data, except for the distress level, which has been directly obtained from Helen
Keller International in Dhaka, are published in various issues of the statistical yearbook of
Bangladesh, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1994).  Data on the dependent variables for
the different programs have been obtained from annual reports from BRAC, ASA, and the
Grameen Bank for 1994 (BRAC 1994; ASA 1994; Grameen Bank 1994).  The data for
PROSHIKA also refers to 1994, and were obtained through interviews with staff from its
headquarters in Dhaka.16
Table 1—Definition and descriptive statistics of regression variables: Thana level
(n = 391)
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
Presence of NGO 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
a
Presence of ASA 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
a
Presence of BRAC 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
a
Presence of PROSHIKA 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
a
Client density (all) 17.86 33.01 0.00 297.59
b
Client density (ASA) 1.94 6.35 0.00 39.80
b
Client density (BRAC) 9.35 24.45 0.00 297.59
b
Client density (PROSHIKA) 6.57 19.95 0.00 155.99
b
Independent Variables
Years of operation (BRAC) 1.46 3.33 0.00 18.00
Years of operation (ASA) 0.41 1.33 0.00 7.00
ELECTRICITY 6.96 8.47 0.00 54.90
LANDSIZE 23.90 7.60 1.97 52.87
LITERATE 24.54 9.94 11.0 60.4
MARKET 26.22 13.37 1 75
DENSITY 791.10 666.54 93.20 10,557.35
URBAN 11.26 16.58 0.00 100.00
ROADS 0.17 0.21 0.00 2.61
POSTOFFICE 16.18 9.69 1 82
HOSPITAL 12,576.33 11,499.45 0 99,726
DOCTOR 42,905.03 44,555.82 0 329,739
DISTRESS 1.1 0.15 1.0 1.5
Source: Statistical Yearbooks (various issues), Bureau of Statistics, Dhaka; BRAC Statistical Report,
RDP and RCP 1989-1993; ASA Annual Report 1994; Grameen Bank Annual Report 1994; data




Client density is defined as the number of NGO clients in the thana divided by the thana’s population.
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5.  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS:  PLACEMENT OF BRANCHES
Placement of branch equations were estimated for all the three NGOs taken
together and for each separately.  These are discussed below.
ALL NGOs
The estimated logit equation where the dependent variable takes on a value of one
when a branch of at least one of the three NGOs exists in the thana and zero otherwise is
presented in Table 2.  A number of interesting results are discussed below.  The
coefficients of ROAD and POSTOFFICE are positive and significant at the 5 percent
level.  These are both infrastructural variables measuring the extent of transportation and
communication facilities in the thana.  The percentage of urban population in the thana
(URBAN) and population density (DENSITY) are not statistically significant.  Neither are
the two health service indicators (HOSPITAL) and (DOCTOR), the number of market
centers in the thana (MARKET), or the percentage of villages that are electrified in the
thana (ELECTRICITY).  It appears therefore that placement decisions are attentive to
transportation and communication facilities, but that the net effect of other infrastructural
facilities measured or proxied by population concentration, urbanization, and the
availability of medical and health services appears to be insignificant. 
The coefficient of LITERATE is negative and is strongly significant. Hence
placement of branches appear to respond to literacy rates—with more branches being 18


















Log likelihood = -172.79
P  = 39.08
2
11,391
Notes: N = 391.    = is significant at 10 percent level;   = is significant at 5 percent level.
*               **
placed in thanas with lower literacy rates. Note that if considerations of demand, costs,
and riskiness favor thanas with higher literacy rates—that is, if ($ + (  + * ) litertate     litertate    litertate
> 0, then it may be concluded that the poverty consideration (" ) is sufficiently large literate
enough to overturn the combined positive effect so that the net effect is negative; that is,
|" | >| $ + (  + * |.  The coefficient of the landholding variable, LANDSIZE, has litert      litert     litert    litert
a similar interpretation—that the poverty effects of the smaller land size more than
outweigh the combined effects on credit demand and risk costs.  LANDSIZE, however, is
not significant at the 10 percent level.
The coefficient of DISTRESS is negative and significant at the five percent level.
NGOs thus are less likely to place branches in high distress locations. Unlike in the case of19
 It may even be the case that there may develop a tacit understanding among NGOs that they keep
3
out of each others' turf.
LITERATE above, it appears that poverty considerations (that are attendant with high-
level distress) are not strong enough to compensate for the negative effects arising out of
conducting business in risk-prone areas.  Significantly, this result indicates the inability of
even large NGOs, such as BRAC and ASA, to effectively deal with risks.
Overall, the estimated branch placement equation indicates that while NGOs appear
to respond to poverty (at least to the extent that they correlate with literacy levels), they
are more likely to place branches in locations that have favorable infrastructure. They also
are less likely to place branches in high distress locations. 
NGO-SPECIFIC EQUATIONS
The equations describing thana-level placement of branches of ASA, BRAC, and
PROSHIKA are presented in Tables 3-5.  The explanatory variables are the same as in the
combined regression in Table 2, except for one extra consideration:  the response of an
NGO to preexisting branches of other NGOs.  On the one hand, it may be the case that
NGOs prefer to work in exclusive markets, in the absence of any competition or any other
types of influences from other providers of similar services.   On the other hand, it may
3
also be the case that pre-existing branches of other NGOs in a particular location may
signal to a potential entrant a community's positive social capital that contributes to social
receptivity and successful operation of group-based programs.  If this is the case, 20















Log likelihood = -45.23
P  = 23.67
2
10,139
Notes: N = 139.   =  Significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **
















Log likelihood = -98.88
P  = 29.40
2
10,252
Notes:  N = 252;    = significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **












Log likelihood = -93.42
P  = 11.87
2
9,308
Notes:  N = 308;   = significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **21
 Of course, when the NGO in question does not have a branch in the particular thana, PRIORCOMP
4
equals whenever a branch of another NGO exists in this thana and zero otherwise.
clustering of NGOs may be observed.  How NGOs respond to preexisting branches of
other NGOs is, hence, an empirical question.  For this reason, an indicator variable,
PRIORCOMP, that takes the value one whenever the branch of another group-based
NGO in the thana existed prior to the placement of a branch of the NGO in question, is
used in the regression equation.   For example, in the BRAC equation, the indicator
4
variable would equal one whenever an ASA branch existed in the thana prior to the
establishment of the BRAC branch and would equal zero otherwise.  In thanas that do not
have a BRAC branch yet, PRIORCOMP = 1 if there is already an ASA branch and zero
otherwise.  Hence the estimated coefficient would indicate the extent to which the
existence of a similar institution operating in the area affects the decision to establish a
branch.  Unfortunately, at the time of writing, data on year of branch establishment were
available for BRAC and ASA, but not for PROSHIKA.  Therefore, the indicator variables
are used only in the BRAC and ASA regressions.  Also, because BRAC’s group-based
credit operation was established well before ASA’s (Jahangir and Zeller 1995), a subset of
observations that includes data only after 1987, when ASA’s credit programs were fully
initiated, was used in the analysis.  The results of the estimated fixed-effects logit
equations are discussed below.22
! The coefficient of PRIORCOMP in both the ASA and the BRAC equations
are negative and significant, indicating that both ASA and BRAC are less
likely to establish branches in locations that already have a “competitor’s”
branch.
! The coefficient of the percentage of population owning less than half an acre
of land (LANDSIZE) is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in both
the ASA and BRAC equations, though this is not the case with the
PROSHIKA equation.  On the other hand, the coefficients of literacy rate
(LITERATE) are negative in all the three NGO-specific equations, though
they are statistically significant only in the BRAC and PROSHIKA equations. 
Note also that LITERATE is the only significant variable in the PROSHIKA
equation.  The NGO-specific equations thus are indicative of placement
decisions responding to poverty conditions, especially BRAC’s decisions,
which respond to both literacy and landholding levels.  Note that the
landholding variable was not significant in the combined NGO regression in
Table 2.
! As for the transport and communication variables, POSTOFFICE is positive
and significant at the 5 percent level in the BRAC equation, while ROAD is
positive and significant, also at the five percent level, in the ASA equation.
This is an interesting result as BRAC aims to conduct its own banking
services in the near future while ASA will continue to use banking services23
offered by commercial banks.  Probably for this reason, it is important for
ASA to locate branches in areas that have better access to transport
infrastructure, because it is this type of area where commercial banks are
located.
! The coefficient for the DISTRESS variable, reflecting on covariate flood and
other risks of distress in the thana, is negative, but significant only in the
BRAC equation.
! None of the other variables are significant in any of the equations.  It should
be noted, however, that in the framework adopted here, it does not mean that
the other variables are not considered at all in the placement decision.  It just
means that their net effect through the four factors (poverty, demand, cost,
and riskiness) are not significantly different from zero.
6.  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: CLIENT COVERAGE
Having examined branch placement outcomes of the three NGOs, we now go on to
examine factors that influence the client outreach of thana-level branches.  Apart from
learning what types of poverty characteristics affect client density, it is also of interest to
examine whether any type of decentralization process characterizes geographical
distribution of service delivery.  As Ravallion and Wodon (1997) point out, in many
targeted programs, it may be the case that the headquarters makes a decision about where
to place a branch, but subsequently leaves it up to local managers to determine the scale of24
operation of the established branch.  Is this also the case of Bangladeshi NGOs?  In this
section, we use participation density (OUTREACH) measured as the number of
participants in a specific program per 1,000 people in the thana as an indicator of client
outreach.
The econometric specification of the outreach regression equations is similar to the
branch placement in equation (6) except that the dependent variable OUTREACH is a
truncated variable:  client coverage is observed only in thanas that have branches.  The
procedure used to correct this sample selection bias is the two-stage Heckman procedure
(1979) whereby a Mills ratio—LAMDA—computed from the branch placement (logit)
equation is used as an additional regressor in the participation density equation and
appropriate adjustments are made in the computation of standard errors (Greene 1993). 
An additional variable YEARS is used in the outreach equation to control for the fact that
client density is expected to increase with years of operation of the branch. YEARS is the
number of years for which the branch has been in operation. However, because YEARS
was not available for PROSHIKA, the outreach equation was estimated using data only
for BRAC and ASA , with YEARS computed as the sum of years that branches of both
ASA and/or BRAC in the thana had been in operation. The combined outreach equation
estimated for ASA and BRAC is presented in Table 3.
In the outreach equation in Table 6, only the coefficients of three variables are
significant:  these are YEARS, LANDSIZE, and DISTRESS.  These are discussed below.25

























Log likelihood = -572.11
F  = 4.62 12,108
Notes:  N = 121;    = significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **
! The coefficient of YEARS is positive and highly significant, indicating that
NGO institutions have expanded their client base through time.  Indeed if it
was the case that YEARS was the only variable significant in the equation,
this would have suggested that once a branch was placed in a particular
location, client coverage was mostly determined without significant reference
to local specificities.  However, this is not the case since at least two other
area characteristics appear to influence outreach. 
! Outreach is significantly higher in thanas that have a higher DISTRESS
index.  This result is completely opposite to that of the placement equation
that had indicated that placement rule disfavored high distress areas.  The
result thus suggests that though branches are less likely to be placed in high26
distress areas, once established, they have higher client densities.  This is a
plausible scenario.  First, it may be that demand for special financial services
like that provided by the NGO institutions is especially large in these
backward, high-risk thanas, especially since these areas are inadequately
served by other market-based or government-sponsored organizations.
Second, it may indeed be part of institutional policy to have higher levels of
outreach in relatively more depressed areas.  Third, as suggested above, it
may also be reflective of partial decentralization in service delivery whereby
local branch managers, once the branch is set up, exercise more control in
outreach-related decision functions that are more responsive to local
conditions.  Indeed, it may well be possible that high outreach requirements
of branches placed in distressed areas may, in fact, put pressure on NGOs to
limit the number of branches operating in such areas. 
! Outreach is significantly lower in thanas that have a higher proportion of
marginal farmers, as shown by the negative coefficient of LANDSIZE.  But it
remains unclear whether this result is driven by supply or demand factors. In
Section 2, it was noted that a significant proportion of the projects financed
by NGOs were off-farm microenterprises engaging in rural trading, food
processing, and handicraft production.  If, indeed, financing off-farm
microenterprises (rather than agricultural production) is one of the main
objectives of the NGO institutions, then outreach would be responsive not27
just to the proportion of the population owning less than 0.5 acres of land,
but also to the presence of landless wage laborers who are likely to be even
poorer. 
! Though it was clear from the placement equations that branches were more
likely to be established in thanas with better communication and
transportation infrastructure, there is no evidence that, once a branch is
established, client outreach also responds to infrastructure-related
characteristics.  This once again suggests discontinuities between the
placement and outreach decision functions.
The NGO-specific equations in Tables 7-9 largely echo the findings of the combined
equation in Table 6 and are therefore not discussed separately.
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our analysis indicates that even though the placement of branches of NGO
institutions were attentive to poverty considerations, branches were more likely to be
established in locations that had better access to transport and communication
infrastructure. Hence it appears that NGO services are geared more toward the poor who
reside in relatively well-developed areas rather than toward the poor in more remote and
less developed regions.  Client density of the existing branches, however, did not exhibit 28






















Log likelihood = -88.64
F  = 1.92 12,17
Notes:  N = 30;    = significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **



















Log likelihood = -328.69
F  = 1.85 12,56
Notes:  N = 69;   = significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **





















Log likelihood = -197.0947
F  = 2.04 11,33
Notes:  N = 50;   = significant at 10 percent level;   = significant at 5 percent level.
*             **29
such a feature and actually tended to be better in less favorable and more "distressed"
locations.
Greater concentration of branches in the better areas may, in part, be the result of a
search for locations where the marginal impact of credit services is the greatest. Typically,
accompanying constraints on production or income—e.g., those imposed by the lack of
markets, transportation, and/or communication—are likely to be less severe in areas that
have good infrastructure.  For example, loans for financing the production of highly
market-dependent outputs—such as production of commercial crops, and other nonfarm
micro enterprises—are less suitable for remote areas.  Moreover, banking services become
especially risky in remote areas where co-variance in household incomes are likely to be
very high.  In such areas, high repayment rates that are necessary to maintain NGOs’
access to subsidized funds from various agencies are harder to achieve. Furthermore, the
unavailability of commercial banks limits financial operations in remote or poor locations.
Hence, as suggested in the previous section, NGOs may follow a strategy of placing fewer
branches in distressed areas, but with each of these branches serving a larger number of
clients.  The tension between poverty targeting and ensuring adequate financial
performance is thus quite clear in the way the NGOs place their services geographically.
If simultaneous efforts to reach the poor, to maximize marginal impact of services,
and to keep loan delinquency at the minimum introduces considerable tension in service
placement decisions of NGOs, solutions for reducing this tension lie in innovative lending
technologies that reduce transactions costs for both lenders and borrowers and increase30
marginal returns of loans for the poor in disadvantaged locations.  We suggest four
strategies towards this end:  (1) area-specific innovations and differentiations in financial
products; (2) performance and location incentives for branch staff; (3) reduction in
dependence on branch offices of commercial banks; and (4) increased donor support for
expansion of programs in the remote and vulnerable areas.
1. Area-specific innovations and differentiations in financial products.  The demand
for different types of loan and savings services is affected by a range of area-specific
factors.  Reducing the cost of credit delivery and increasing the marginal impact of
credit on borrowers depend on the extent to which credit and savings services are
responsive to area-specific characteristics.  However, it is presently the case that
financial products of nongovernmental organizations are usually standardized for
the entire country.  While the branch managers have sufficient decision flexibility in
managing the headquarters-prescribed array of financial products, they do not have
the flexibility to design new financial products or introduce modifications to existing
ones.  Presumably, headquarters offices do not possess the full information
necessary to evaluate the potentials and constraints of service branches.  Hence, it is
suggested that lower-tier institutions, such as divisional or district offices, be given
some flexibility and incentives to modify existing financial and other services or to
introduce new services on a pilot level.  Such area-specific modification and31
innovation may well cover the terms of the credit contract, including spatial
differentiation of interest rates.
2. Performance and location incentives for branch staff.  To improve outreach and
cost recovery in bank branches, managers and their staff could receive special
incentives for above-average performance.  Successful innovations by branch or
district managers, as mentioned above, could be especially rewarded.  Furthermore,
if the presumed self-selection of good managers to urban areas is valid, some form
of compensatory payments could be given to managing staff or branch offices that
operate in remote areas where access to basic social services and economic
infrastructure is lacking.
3. Reduction in dependence on branch offices of commercial banks.  NGO branches
currently depend on a commercial bank office at which funds are deposited and
withdrawn.  This has the effect of limiting the outreach of the NGOs only to those
areas where such bank branches exist.  The Grameen Bank, one of the pioneers in
microcredit, has chosen to maintain its own network of branch offices that perform
all functions of money transfer between branches and regional offices and
headquarters.  When other NGO-supported financial systems reach a critical size,
they may well follow this example; BRAC, for example, actually plans to develop a
rural bank branch network of its own.  However, for the smaller NGOs, this would
not be economical.  A solution here may lie in the establishment of subdistrict NGO
units in remote areas that act as “NGO bank branches” by mediating between32
individual branch offices and commercial bank branches.  The establishment of such
units may well be supported by a consortium of NGOs targeting a particularly
vulnerable area so that the unit services a number of NGOs at the same time.  Yet
another possibility is that of mobile banking where remote branch offices are served
by regional or district NGO or commercial bank offices on a prescribed time
schedule.  Insofar as above-average-skill managers exhibit a preference for locating
themselves near towns, the system of mobile banking allows remote branches to be
continued to be served by a cadre of qualified managers instead of being “trainee
branches."  For the borrower or saver, it provides access where this was not
possible before.
4. Increased government and donor support for expansion of programs in
particularly remote and vulnerable areas.  The placement of a branch office, the
recruitment and training of its personnel, and the formation and training of groups
require considerable up-front investments, especially in remoter areas.  However, it
is also likely that many remote thanas in Bangladesh that are currently not served
have sufficient long-term demand that is able to support total cost of operation.
Hence, donor and government support to target selected remote areas, and
accelerate expansion of the branch network in these areas can, in many cases, be
justified, both from the efficiency and equity perspectives.33
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